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Abstract
2018 will mark the 60th anniversary of the publication of Public Principles of Public Debt. The Nobel-prize
winning economist’s first book conflicted with the Keynesian orthodoxy of the day, and added fresh ideas to
an ongoing debate over the fundamentals of public debt theory. This paper seeks to outline the dialogue
among leading economists surrounding public debt since the publication of Public Principles of Public Debt,
examining the major schools of thought and their development. The ideas of John Maynard Keynes, James
Buchanan, and Richard Barro will receive attention, without neglecting other significant contributions. The
paper will conclude by examining current papers in the field of public debt theory, considering them in light of
the noted historical ideas. Despite the foundational nature of James Buchanan’s work in public finance, his
cautions regarding the assumptions, methodology, incentives, and institutions of public debt, particularly his
integration of public choice, are not treated centrally in many ongoing analyses. The empirical nature of much
current public debt theory and research has led away from the presuppositional roots of the public debt
debate. Renewed awareness of the historical and theoretical realities of public debt theory will be valuable for
the field, and can provide reinvigorated application of public choice. This paper works toward those goals,
examining the 60 years of public debt theory history since the publication of James Buchanan’s Public
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Public Principles and Economic Legacy 
Stanley Schwartz 
Business Administration— Cedarville University 
Introduction 
efore the crisis of stagflation in the 1970’s, Keynesian economics was at its peak of 
academic and popular strength. Paul Samuelson’s popularizing textbooks had 
brought the new macroeconomic model a widespread acceptance and broad 
application of its principles. In the field of public finance, this school favored a generally 
Panglossian assessment of public debt as not harmful to national budgeting because of the 
idea that “we owe it to ourselves.” As long as the nation’s citizens are the holders of its debt, 
issuing more does not decrease national wealth. At the same time, many Americans were 
skeptical of this justification of public debt. The popular perception was that government 
debt, like individual debt, subtracted from future revenue streams. Consumption now 
meant costs later. If this layman’s conception of public debt was correct, the Keynesian 
public finance practiced by the U.S. government indicated irresponsibility and a risk of 
serious financial problems in the future. 
 
Economist James Buchanan studied in Italy from 1955-56 and became steeped in its 
history and literature of public finance.1 That year provided him with resources and ideas 
that developed some of his thoughts in public finance and led to the completion of a book, 
Public Principles of Public Debt, which challenged the Keynesian orthodoxy.2 The responses 
to Buchanan’s work, followed by his ongoing contributions to the field, energized a debate 
which continued among the major participants into the 1970’s. Robert Barro’s entry into 
the conversation at that point renewed and reshaped the conflict, providing a new 
framework that is foundational for much of the recent work in the field. As a result of the 
turn toward Barro’s model, public finance today has again fallen into errors that James 
Buchanan demonstrated and sought to correct nearly 60 years ago. James Buchanan’s 
contributions to public finance, beginning with Public Principles of Public Debt and 
continuing with his integration of Public Choice, provide a foundational framework and 
corrective to error.  This paper seeks to demonstrate that a revived understanding of 
Buchanan’s public finance work on public debt will be valuable for precise analyses moving 
forward.  
 
An examination of Buchanan’s key works and those of his opponents will show the power 
of his argumentation over time. This study will also demonstrate the versatility of 
Buchanan’s work in refuting multiple critiques and opposing models. Finally, a review of 
relevant current literature will conclude the paper with an understanding of how 
                                                          
1 R.E. Wagner, “James Buchanan’s public debt theory: a rational reconstruction,” Constitutional Political 
Economy,  (2014) 25: 257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9161-3 
2 Ibid, 257-258.  
B 
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Buchanan’s work is utilized today. In many technical works, the application of Buchanan’s 
principles and applied models is unfortunately lacking. However, prominent economists in 
the current debate over public debt, particularly in the United States, still utilize 
Buchanan’s work as they consider the empirical and institutional situation of public finance 
today. Lastly, there is a presence of some of Buchanan’s most salient points in current 
textbooks, even those from economists generally inclined to different ideological 
conclusions than Buchanan. This suggests a successful penetration of Buchanan’s public 
debt theory into the field, but the possibility of further growth and improvement for public 
finance if Buchanan’s work is properly understood, especially along his Public Choice 
analyses. 
The Impact of Public Principles – Buchanan and the Keynesians 
In Public Principles of Public Debt, Buchanan lays out the core ideas of the Keynesian 
orthodoxy of his day and then presents his arguments in a clear contrast. The first and most 
seminal point of contention is whether or not the burden of debt is shifted into the future. 
For Keynesians, the answer was no; the cost or burden of the debt is “the real sacrifice of 
private goods and services” that the government spending requires, and this sacrifice must 
occur in the present.3 There is no burden in the future because the interest payments and 
tax payments resulting from the debt are both located in the future. The costs of tax 
payments are balanced by the benefits of interest payments such that public debt in the 
future is something which we simply owe to ourselves as a nation. This national 
aggregation and future balance perspective is the crux of the Keynesian argument on public 
debt. 
 
Buchanan disputes the premises and conclusion that his opponents offered, arguing 
instead for a potential future burden from public debt issue. To Buchanan, the present 
bondholders do not bear the burden of the debt because they are not making a sacrifice. 
They freely choose to lend because it meets their preferences – they are moving to a higher, 
not lower, position on their individual utility surfaces.4 Unless this were true, the 
bondholders would not have chosen to voluntarily surrender their present consumption 
for the delayed gratification of the bond. Under standard theory, this voluntary choice 
indicates the highest expected utility curve. The future taxpayers, on the other hand, are 
compelled to pay more than they would have without the public debt issue, and they do so 
without the guarantee the bondholders receive of a preferred future asset. Thus, the 
burden of the debt does not fall on present bondholders, but on future taxpayers.  
 
Buchanan argues that the answer to burden incidence becomes obvious upon asking a 
simple question: “Who suffers if the public borrowing is unwise and the public expenditure 
wasteful?”5 Even if this harmful scenario occurs, the present bondholder is not injured 
more than otherwise – he still has interest payments to compensate for the shift in his 
income stream as he would under a beneficial and wise public spending. Thus, as current 
                                                          
3 James Buchanan, The Collected Works of James Buchanan: Volume 2 - Public Principles of Public Debt: A 
Defense and Restatement, (Liberty Fund Inc., Indianapolis: IN, 1999), 6.  
4 Ibid, 28.  
5 Ibid, 32. 




taxpayers are not bearing the burden for the given public expenditure, future taxpayers 
must do so. Through its group focus, the argument that the impact to national finance in the 
future is balanced between tax payments and interest payments misses the importance of 
the individual. The bondholder’s individual balance sheet properly includes both the 
present reduction and future increase in income stream, while the future taxpayer’s 
individual balance sheet is reduced by tax payments and only increased by the personal 
value of whatever social or economic asset the public debt creates.6 Thus, Buchanan 
overturned the Keynesian orthodoxy on the burden of public debt by correcting the level of 
analysis and reevaluating the idea of a bondholder’s sacrifice.  
 
Having undermined the fundamentals of the Keynesian position, Buchanan next considered 
whether its proponents were correct in arguing broadly that private debt and public debt 
were unrelated. Buchanan’s opponents contended that public debt is not a reduction from 
the national income stream - as private debt reduces an individual’s income stream - 
because future interest payments offset future tax payments. Public debt only creates 
future transfers within the nation, thus not reducing national wealth by this reckoning. This 
is usually expressed in the statement concerning public debt that “we owe it to ourselves.” 
One Keynesian wrote: “Thus an internal loan raised by the state is not really a loan in the 
ordinary sense since it possesses none of the essential characteristics of such a 
transaction.”7 Clearly, this point is tied to the previous one about the location of the burden 
of the public debt and how this should be considered. Therefore, Buchanan ties the two 
considerations together to present the Keynesian position: an individual borrower gains 
wealth in the present but must face a sacrifice in the future. However, the public borrower 
does not face a sacrifice in the future because interest and tax payments balance.  
 
To refute this argument, Buchanan appeals to something he believes the Keynesians 
missed: “only the decrease in the net worth of the taxpayers may be attributed to the fiscal 
operation under consideration.”8 Buchanan notes that bondholders would have chosen to 
lend with or without the public debt issue. Their interest payments would remain absent 
the issue of public debt, stemming instead from private capital investment. By contrast, the 
taxpayers’ loss due to future tax increases is a unique feature that would not have occurred 
without the public debt. Therefore, understanding the national outcome of public debt as 
equally good for bondholders and bad for taxpayers, and thus neutral on net, as the 
Keynesians proposed, is incorrect. The loss of the taxpayers through increased tax 
payments is an unmitigated burden from public debt, paralleling an individual’s loss in 
future interest payments. On Buchanan’s arguments, the analogy between individual and 
public debt holds, despite the contentions of the Keynesian new orthodoxy that public debt 
was uniquely non-burdensome.  
 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 33.  
7 Jorgen Pederson, cited by James Buchanan in Public Principles of Public Debt, (Indianapolis, 1999), 38, 
cited from Alvin H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, (New York, 1941), 142. 
8 James Buchanan, The Collected Works of James Buchanan: Volume 2 - Public Principles of Public Debt: A 
Defense and Restatement, (Liberty Fund Inc., Indianapolis: IN, 1999), 42.  
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The final point that Buchanan critiques is the last tenet of the new orthodoxy, which argues 
that internal debt and external debt are fundamentally and sharply different. In this stream 
of thought, A.C. Pigou wrote “It is true that loans raised from foreigners entail a burden in 
the interest and sinking fund on future generations in the borrowing country. But interest 
and sinking funds on internal loans are merely transfers from one set of people in the 
country to another set.”9 No matter the relevant rates of interest, then, the government 
should operate with internal debt as a result of this analysis. 
 
Buchanan disagrees, noting that the result of issuing internal debt is the removal of 
significant streams of domestic savings that would have been productively invested in the 
domestic economy.10 Future private income streams are decreased under internal debt, 
with the magnitude of the loss depending on the rate of return for private capital 
investment. External debt finances public expenditure from foreign savings, allowing future 
income streams to be higher at first, with resulting costs of interest paid to external 
bondholders. Thus, the only difficulty of financial transfer from external savings, due to 
institutional or currency problems for instance, can differentiate internal and external 
debt.11 The rate of return which the bonds will need to provide is the definitive factor in 
deciding between internal and external debt, unless transfer problems are severe.  
 
Finally, after rejecting the three tenets of the Keynesian orthodoxy, Buchanan moves into a 
brief discussion of the political and institutional realities surrounding public debt. He notes 
the important incentive regarding public debt in democracies: because the burden falls on 
future taxpayers and the benefit accrues to present citizens, almost any perceived present 
good will present a temptation to issue debt.12 This presents concerns with debt issue as 
both a seriously and pervasively problematic instrument among Public Finance tools. 
Importantly, this also means that it is unlikely that citizens would be willing to allow tax 
increases to fund long-term expenditures. Today’s citizens would bear the cost in that case, 
while tomorrow’s citizens would get the benefits.  
 
Further, there is no market for an asset that will be created in the future, so the individual 
in this public context cannot properly evaluate the asset or program the government 
spending is proposed to create.13 Similarly, there is no way to accurately calculate the cost 
of future debt in comparison with a current asset that is easily marketable. The collective 
decision-making process cannot discount correctly.14 Thus, long-term projects should be 
tied to long-term debt so that costs and benefits align, with short-term projects and 
taxation paired as well. Still, Buchanan notes that even this precaution may not succeed in 
                                                          
9 A.C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, (3d ed. London, 1949), cited by James Buchanan in Public Principles 
of Public Debt, (Liberty Fund Inc., Indianapolis: IN, 1999), 59.  
10 James Buchanan, Public Principles of Public Debt, (Liberty Fund, Inc., Indianapolis, IN: 1999), 61.  
11 Ibid, 65.  
12 Ibid, 120.  
13 Ibid, 124.  
14 Ibid, 123.  




producing ideal social outcomes if one group, such as an impoverished majority, controls 
financial levers and uses them in a partisan struggle with other factions.15  
Early Responses to Buchanan 
Naturally, Buchanan’s arguments in Public Principles of Public Debt did not go unanswered. 
Keynesian reviews of this work, as well as independent articles moving forward, presented 
several critiques of his contentions. As one commentator on this debate has noted, these 
authors, while “generally respectful,” “pretty much rejected” Buchanan’s central claims in 
Public Principles of Public Debt.16 One good example of such a review is the one given by 
Earl Rolph in the American Economic Review. Rolph argued that Buchanan’s work was 
polemical in nature and controversial in tone, separating it from good academic 
literature.17 Further, he argues that Buchanan’s use of the term “new orthodoxy” for a 
group of economic thinkers that Rolph saw as diverse and varied, is improper and 
harmful.18 No clear policy implications or principles emerge from the work on Rolph’s 
reading, and he reiterated the Keynesian argument regarding the impossibility of burden-
shifting: 
 
The cost of construction is the value of resources used to produce them. Such 
costs are contemporaneous; present resources are being used to produce 
planes instead of other present things. In this sense of cost, there can be no 
postponement regardless of any accompanying financial devices.19 
 
Rolph thereby maintained the positions that Buchanan denoted as belonging to the new 
orthodoxy without conceding that such an orthodoxy existed. A further Keynesian rebuttal 
came with James Tobin’s review of Public Debt and Future Generations, an anthology edited 
by James Ferguson that includes three articles by Buchanan tracing his key arguments. Like 
Rolph, Tobin held the burden of debt in the present, noting this as Buchanan’s central point 
of attack and presenting the counterpoint as follows: “The debt can be no burden, because 
future payments of interest or principal from taxpayers to bondholders will be transfers 
involving no aggregate draft on resources.”20 More importantly, Tobin found Buchanan’s 
basic assumptions unconvincing, namely that unnecessary taxation is coercive and harmful, 
while government use of market operations do not result in a burden.21 Tobin argued that 
borrowers displaced by government debt issue are harmed in the present due to the lost 
access to a possibly more advantageous option, so that even though lenders maintain 
utility, not everyone does. Overall, Tobin did suggest that only Buchanan’s presuppositional 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 131.  
16 R.E. Wagner, “James Buchanan’s public debt theory: a rational reconstruction,” Constitutional Political 
Economy,  (2014) 25: 254. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9161-3 
17 Earl Rolph, “Public Principles of Public Debt,” in American Economic Review 49, no. 1, (1959), 183, 185.  
18 Ibid, 184. 
19 Ibid, 184.  
20 James Tobin, “The Burden of the Public Debt: A Review Article,” Journal of Finance 20, no. 4 (Dec., 
1965), 680.  
21 Ibid, 680.  
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framework of taxes as inherently burdensome and an appropriate individualized level of 
analysis, among all the contributions in the volume, could disturb the economic orthodoxy 
on public debt.22 Fundamentally identifying tax payments as a burden means that debt 
issue, by definition, shifts the burden to future generations, but for Tobin this is not a given. 
A final example of an attack on Buchanan’s work came in an article by EJ Mishan. Although 
only published in 1963, Mishan’s work, “How to Make a Burden of the Public Debt,” was 
openly targeted against Buchanan’s attempt to establish a viewpoint contrary to Keynesian 
orthodoxy. Mishan specifically notes the publication of Public Principles of Public Debt as 
the start of the movement that he describes as the “new heretics.”23 Mishan critiqued 
Buchanan on general and specific grounds. First, Mishan argues that future taxes are not 
necessary if government bond issue creates productive assets.24 Second, Mishan objects 
that changing individual tastes indicates a lack of guaranteed welfare increase for the 
bondholder.25 For example, a bondholder might prefer today a certain level of current 
consumption and future income, but in ten years the preferred ratio may be so wholly 
changed that the bondholder will recognize a loss of utility, despite the fact that his past 
action was preferred at that time.  
 
Mishan’s arguments include repeated appeals to the idea that government will not spend 
wastefully and that government spending can certainly produce “a greater social yield than 
that arising from private expenditure.”26 Assuming this argument and comparing relevant 
alternatives, as Buchanan does throughout his work, should lead to a result in favor of 
government finance. In other areas of the new orthodoxy, Mishan defends simply by 
restatement. For instance, regarding Buchanan’s arguments on internal and external debt, 
Mishan points out that Buchanan cannot “detract from the simple proposition that if an 
existing debt is internally held ‘we owe it to ourselves,’ while if it is held externally ‘we owe 
it to the foreigner.’”27 Lengthy quotes of A.C. Pigou serve to strengthen his arguments with 
authority. Buchanan’s framework regarding the effect of government bond issue on private 
savings is faulty on the theory of these past thinkers because he ignores Ricardian 
equivalence, the resultant inflation, and a change in savings preferences resulting from the 
bond issue which Keynesianism expects.28 Mishan’s arguments are strongest when he 
concedes points to Buchanan, but notes that Keynesianism or the “new orthodoxy” would 
already endorse these points wholeheartedly. For instance, Mishan admits government 
surely should not spend when funds could be used more productively in the private sector 
but that current public expenditures have higher social yield than if left to private sector.29 
Mishan’s article is representative of the various attempts to defend the Keynesian 
                                                          
22 Ibid, 682.  
23 E.J. Mishan, “How to Make a Burden of the Public Debt,” The Journal of Political Economy LXXI, no. 6, 
(Dec. 1963), 530-531.  
24 Ibid, 533.  
25 Ibid, 533.  
26 Ibid, 534.  
27 Ibid, 535. 
28 Ibid, 532 
29 Ibid, 532 




consensus in public finance while critiquing Buchanan’s perceptions of taxation as 
burdensome and government spending as not uniquely productive.  
 
Neither the extent nor the intensity of these critiques indicates a general contemporary 
consensus against Buchanan’s ideas in Public Principles of Public Debt, especially when 
understood in light of other reviews. Vance Alvis described the work as “a scholarly 
presentation” with a “real contribution” that “should be read by everyone seriously 
concerned with public debt policy.”30 Alvis presented very little critique in his discussion, 
choosing instead to relate in more depth the fundamental points Buchanan made. Alvis did 
contest Buchanan’s third major point, that the internal and external debt were not sharply 
distinguished, and argues that U.S. institutions may not provide a feasible platform for 
some elements of Buchanan’s ideas, such as more extensive money creation.31 Still, overall, 
Alvis found little to take issue with in Buchanan’s work.  
 
Mary Sue Garner Staig, in her review for The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, agrees 
with critics like Rolph that Buchanan’s position might have caused “explosive controversy,” 
but also found his arguments “meticulously logical” and “ably presented and defended.”32 
In her work, as in Alvis’s, there was little defense or presentation of the Keynesian 
orthodoxy that Buchanan opposed, and a generally sympathetic presentation of the 
position argued in Public Principles of Public Debt. In contrast to Alvis, Staig argued that 
Buchanan’s arguments were accessible outside of the economics profession, but otherwise 
there was significant agreement.  
 
Finally, Ansel Sharp, with a review in The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, saw 
Buchanan’s work as a strong and impactful, if imperfect, perspective on public debt. For 
instance, Sharp criticized the new orthodoxy in general, contending that Buchanan “argued 
devastatingly” against it, but the reviewer still maintained some elements of the Keynesian 
perspective. For instance, Sharp correctly states that there are still key differences between 
private debt and public debt because public debt has more sure resources to call upon in 
tax revenue and Federal Reserve support than a private citizen could muster.33 Like Alvis, 
Sharp also concluded that Buchanan puts too little weight on the transfer costs which make 
internal debt distinctly advantageous compared to external debt.34 Nevertheless, Sharp’s 
support for the overall thrust of Public Principles of Public Debt should not be missed, as he 
clearly stated “Buchanan successfully replaces the we-owe-it-to-ourselves type of 
reasoning with sound economic reasoning.”35 Further, he finds the overall framework 
Buchanan presents extremely powerful:  
 
                                                          
30 Vance Alvis, “Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement,” Journal of Finance 14, no. 1 
(Mar., 1959), 126.  
31 Ibid, 125-126.  
32 Mary Sue Garner Staig, “Public Principles of Public Debt,” The Southwestern Science Quarterly 39, no. 3 
(Dec., 1958), 266.  
33 Ansel Sharp, “A General Theory of Public Debt,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 19, 
no. 1 (Oct., 1959), 109.  
34 Ibid, 109.  
35 Ibid, 108.  
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The significance of Buchanan's analysis lies in the general framework which 
it provides for public debt analysis. A framework within which public debt 
may be analyzed under the Classical economic condition of full employment 
and the Keynesian economic condition of unemployment; a framework 
which has its philosophical starting point in the individual or the family; a 
framework which discards the pain cost doctrine and replaces it with the 
opportunity cost doctrine; a framework which views the relevant 
alternatives of private lenders and the differential effects of tax, debt, and 
currency financing; a framework which distinguishes between the effects of 
securing funds and the effects of spending these funds, and considers the 
combined effect of the financing-spending operation: a framework which 
provides the basis for better public policy decisions. 
 
Overall, the reviews may demonstrate a slight consensus that saw Public Principles of Public 
Debt as a key contribution that is most important in its overall framework for 
understanding public debt in times of full employment or unemployment. It would go too 
far to argue that all reviewers saw Buchanan’s analysis as scholarly, strong, logical, and 
dispassionate, making this work a powerful contrast to prevailing economic theory. 
Nevertheless, some certainly were of this opinion, and the key points of agreement, among 
both supporters and opponents of Buchanan’s early contributions, were that he had 
succeeded in generating a significant contrast with prevailing theory that, if accurate, had 
serious implications for the field of public finance.  
Buchanan’s Responses to Critiques 
Buchanan continued to engage in this developing debate, defending his ideas and their 
formulation by responding to critics. One example would be his response to EJ Mishan, 
entitled “Confessions of a Burden Monger,” in the Journal of Political Economy. In this essay, 
Buchanan argued that the taxpayer under normal “voluntaristic political” conditions will 
not discount future tax payments as a result of their knowledge of the increasing debt 
level.36 He did not reject the equivalent response to tax or loan financing under conditions 
of “perfect certainty and perfectly working capital markets,” but simply found this 
theoretical consideration to be practically unimportant.37 In Buchanan’s mind, the methods 
of tax and debt finance are alternatives for public financing of expenditures. Indeed, the 
very point of debt, both in general and as a contrast to tax finance, is to push costs into the 
future.38  
 
Finally, Buchanan made methodological observations regarding Mishan’s criticisms. 
Buchanan pointed out Mishan’s inability to separate debt issue and money issue as 
different means of government finance, arguing that the merits of each depends on the 
                                                          
36 James Buchanan, The Collected Works of James Buchanan, Vol. 14, Debt and Taxes, “Confessions of a 
Burden Monger,” (Liberty Fund Inc., Indianapolis: IN, 1999), 358. 
37 Ibid, 358.  
38 Ibid, 358.  




economic environment concerning inflation.39 Buchanan distanced himself from the idea 
that politicians should infer something about “the desirability of budget deficits” from an 
economic discussion of the burden of public debt. Nevertheless, he stated clearly that “the 
economist should not retreat ever further into technical and terminological obscurity” 
when simple analysis is possible.40  
 
In his response to James Tobin, an article titled “The Icons of Public Debt” in the Journal of 
Finance, Buchanan is more focused on defending the presuppositions of utility maximizing 
individuals and the beneficial nature of free action that Tobin attacked. He begins with a 
counterattack, arguing that he is not the only one with fundamental assumptions, but 
rather that, “My notions about debt burden seem to counter images that are more than 
intellectual constructions, more than scientific paradigms.”41 According to Buchanan, 
Tobin’s unwillingness to accept Buchanan’s founding assumptions is not a reasoned 
rejection but one of emotion. Further, he attempts to show that his own arguments are 
based on fundamental facts and not assumptions about the coerciveness or compulsion felt 
as a result of government action. “The fact that taxes are payments is, in itself, sufficient. In 
this sense, taxes are no different from prices paid in market transactions. The payment of 
prices for ordinary goods and services is also, per se, a burden. This we all accept without 
the sophistication of economic theory.”42 
 
Further, Buchanan attempted to defend the broader context of his theoretical framework, 
arguing against Tobin that full employment conditions are not the only situation to which 
public finance analysis can or should be applied.43 Also, Buchanan insists on establishing 
the separate decisions of individuals to vote for debt finance and to purchase government 
bonds. The former choice is made by individuals in a group, while the latter is “strictly 
individualistic.”44 This prevents debt issue from being understood only in the Keynesian 
framework of aggregation which asserts that we owe it [public debt] to ourselves. All in all, 
Buchanan conceded very little to his critics, setting up a conflict of assumptions, 
frameworks, methods, and conclusions, what Buchanan called a “murky battleground.”45 
 
The result of the initial major clash between Buchanan and his opponents in the Keynesian 
orthodoxy did not lead to a single winner dominating the resulting literature alone. 
Nevertheless, in the ensuing years, Buchanan’s contributions began to penetrate the field of 
public finance to a greater extent. One example of this comes in an article by Roger Spencer 
and William Yohe in 1970. They argued that crowding out of private investment is a key 
problem for public debt issue. Closer to full employment, crowding out becomes very 
                                                          
39 Ibid, 360.  
40 Ibid, 360.  
41 James Buchanan, The Collected Works of James Buchanan, Vol. 14, Debt and Taxes, “The Icons of Public 
Debt,” (Liberty Fund Inc., Indianapolis: IN, 1999), 361. 
42 Ibid, 362.  
43 Ibid, 363.  
44 Ibid, 363.  
45 Ibid, 361.  
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significant. Interest rate increases, decreased confidence from government action, and an 
inability to raise overall demand in the face of price level changes are key problems. Thus, 
to the authors, Buchanan was correct – government expenditure must be examined in light 
of government income, not separated. Furthermore, the authors rely on Buchanan 
explicitly, first in consideration of how fractional reserve banking impacts public debt 
issue, and then also in relation to the complex assumptions behind Keynesian multiplier 
theory.46 If the Keynesians had been considered victorious in the public debt debate, 
Buchanan’s work would not have been relied on in this fashion. Thus, the literature does 
not indicate that Buchanan’s contributions were abandoned by the 1970’s, but that they 
were becoming increasingly impactful. 
Robert Barro and Ricardian Equivalence 
Nevertheless, with the publication of an article by Robert Barro in 1974, a new chapter 
opened in the history of Buchanan’s contribution to the public debt field of public finance. 
The article “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” sought to address the same 
“expansionary fiscal policy” of Keynesian new orthodoxy that drew Buchanan’s attention in 
1959.47 Yet, the methodology employed by Barro, along with his conclusions, led to a 
conflict with Buchanan’s earlier synthesis. By framing the public debt in terms of net 
wealth, rather than burdens, Barro’s article, and subsequent defenses, tended to focus on 
constructing situations where certain premises might hold in contrast to Buchanan’s 
concern with the real and present economic and political context of public debt.  
In his foundational article, Barro contends that government bonds are net wealth if the 
government has a monopoly on bond liquidity services, or if the government is more 
efficient at the margin than the market. He begins by postulating a strong form of the basic 
Ricardian equivalence: 
 
[H]ouseholds regard deficit financing as equivalent to taxation. The issue of a 
bond by the government to finance expenditures involves a liability for 
future interest payments and possible ultimate repayment of principal, and 
thus implies future taxes that would not be necessary if the expenditures 
were financed by current taxation. . . . If future tax liabilities implicit in deficit 
financing are accurately foreseen, the level at which total tax receipts are set 
is immaterial; the behavior of the community will be exactly the same as if 
the budget were continuously balanced.48 
 
Barro here argued that Ricardian equivalence prevents government bonds from being 
perceived as additional national wealth; households simply adjust their spending and 
saving patterns to neutralize the impact of public debt issue. He gives two possible counter-
arguments to his application of Ricardian equivalence in the area of public finance. First, 
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taxpayers will experience a net positive present value for government bonds over the 
future costs in taxation they entail because of their finite lives.49 Second, taxpayers will 
have a higher discount rate for future tax liabilities than for the interest payments with 
which they correspond.50 While Barro does not cite Buchanan in defense of these two 
arguments, the latter author had used both in Public Principles of Public Debt 15 years 
earlier.  
 
In the first case, Buchanan wrote that “the Ricardian argument would be acceptable if 
individuals lived eternal lives…[but the] individual must operate within a reasonably 
limited time horizon. If this is accepted the Ricardian argument falls”.51 Second, Buchanan 
argued that “the same absence of a market will cause the individual also to undervalue (in a 
relative sense) future tax payments which are necessary to service debt which has financed 
current capital outlay.”52 Barro’s paper seeks to disprove these two critiques of Ricardian 
equivalence, because they both suggest a net positive present wealth effect for government 
bonds that  is necessary for debt issue to increase aggregate demand as expansionary fiscal 
policy hopes. 
 
These two critiques on Ricardian equivalence suggest a net positive present wealth effect 
for government bonds that is necessary for depth issue to increase aggregate demand as 
expansionary fiscal policy hopes. Because of these suggestions, Barro’s paper seeks to 
disprove Buchanan’s critiques.  
 
 Barro attempts to show that the aggregate demand impact is not tenable, thus critiquing 
Keynesianism but also undercutting Buchanan’s fundamental assumptions.  
 
To begin his critique of the finite lives argument, Barro assumes an overlapping 
generations model where individuals maximize their utility based on their present 
consumption and that of their descendants.53 Thus, following government bond-issue, 
individuals will alter their bequest amount to create an equivalence that offsets the tax 
payments of the future generations.54 Similarly, spending on educational infrastructure by 
the government will result in households decreasing their discretionary transfers. To 
defend the likelihood of this occurring in terms of the individual choices, Barro wrote as 
follows: 
 
[I]f, prior to the government bond issue, a member of the old generation had 
already selected a positive bequest, it is clear that this individual already had 
the option of shifting resources from his descendant to himself, but he had 
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determined that such shifting, at the margin was nonoptimal. Since the 
change in B does not alter the relevant opportunity set in this sense, it 
follows that—through the appropriate adjustment of the bequest—the 
values of current and future consumption and attained utility will be 
unaffected.55 
 
Barro generalizes these results to generations further from the initial debt issue and 
mathematically justifies the argument for equivalence. With the first attack on Ricardian 
equivalence critiqued, he moves to the second assumption of imperfect capital markets. 
This he disposes of by arguing that the government may be a more efficient lender than the 
private market over a certain range of lending behavior. As a result, “at the margin, the net-
wealth effect of government bonds would be zero, despite the continued existence of 
‘imperfect private capital markets.’”56  
 
Given these findings, Barro is prepared to make strong conclusions about the overall public 
finance impact of debt issue by the government. He wrote that, “a change in the stock of 
government debt would have no effect on capital formation,” and “fiscal effects involving 
changes in the relative amounts of tax and debt finance for a given amount of public 
expenditure would have no effect on aggregate demand, interest rates, and capital 
formation.”57 On this ground, Buchanan’s contributions regarding the burden of public debt 
appear outmoded because debt finance, absolutely or relative to tax finance, has little 
substantive impact on economic fundamentals. Its primary effect on behavior is simply to 
stir the reaction to equivalence so that no party is either better or worse off than under an 
alternative. 
 
Barro did recognize that some of his underlying assumptions in modelling are fairly 
unrealistic. For instance, Barro concedes that, given the fact that households may not be 
identical, the impact of government debt issue depends on the preferences of the 
households and the relative share of each type of household in variable bequest motive 
scenarios.58 Further, he argues that the equilibrium utility under his model of equivalence 
not only requires individuals to bequest optimization, but that all individuals “choose the 
same amount for their bequests.”59 Nevertheless, he presented the model and its resulting 
conclusions with strength and chose to back them up further in subsequent articles.  
 One such contribution was the article “Federal Deficit Policy and the Effect of Public Debt 
Shocks” written in 1980. Here, he argues that the systematic parts of federal deficit policy 
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have been reasonable, given a government objective of “stabilizing anticipated overall tax 
rates over time.”60 To summarize, he wrote as follows: 
 
The major movements in privately held, interest-bearing federal debt can be 
explained as aspects of a policy for achieving an intertemporally efficient 
collection of net revenues in the face of fluctuations in government 
expenditures, national income, and inflation. There is also some indication 
that the (random) departures of debt changes from the regular pattern have 
contributed to movements in the unemployment rate and output. However, 
the fluctuations from this source that have presently been isolated are 
substantially smaller than those associated with monetary disturbances. 61 
 
As a result of this thesis, where government debt is understood to vary according to 
efficient and skillful policy-making with logical long-term objectives, Barro found the 
suspicion of the public debt size and process to be unfortunate. He remarked that it was 
“disturbing” to see a push toward a constitutionally mandated balanced federal budget 
because of the resulting inefficiencies that this would no doubt create for government 
financial officials in action.62 Buchanan was by this time involved in exactly the type of 
political action Barro was critiquing. Given his view of debt as burdensome to future 
generations, the former’s foundational work in the area of public choice economics and 
public finance naturally led him to the recourse of a balanced budget amendment and as 
something incentivized to current taxpayers of finite lives. Nevertheless, despite 
Buchanan’s clear authority, Barro carried forward his critiques on empirical grounds, 
arguing that policy of Buchanan’s mode,  
 
[W]ould be expected to achieve some reduction in the size of the public 
sector at the expense of increased misallocation per unit of government 
spending. Such policies seem clearly to be dominated by direct restrictions 
on the amount of government expenditure, especially in the area of transfers, 
and by other direct limitations on the scope of governmental powers.63 
 
Barro seemingly preferred a focus on efficiency rather than limitation, and as his paper 
promoted the existing efficiency of government debt decisions, drastic action was 
unnecessary.  
Buchanan’s Critiques of Barro 
Buchanan responded sharply to Barro’s entrance into the dialogue over public debt with a 
number of individual and cooperative articles. When addressing Barro’s overlapping 
generations model, Buchanan first notes that Barro’s model of bond issue does not 
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establish a clear rationale for why the government would act as he proposes.64 Questioning 
Barro’s assumption that “‘the increase in B, [public debt] implies a one-to-one increase in 
the asset supply,’” given the naturally resulting reduction in private investment or 
consumption, Buchanan simply declared Barro’s model “bizarre.”65  
 
Buchanan continued with a number of further objections to Barro’s presuppositions and 
conclusions on practical, not mathematical grounds. For instance, Buchanan critiques him 
as being too willing to generalize from the example of Social Security, leading to a flawed 
and restricted conclusion rather than a universally applicable model.66 Buchanan’s most 
powerful critique came on empirical examination of the behavior of public officials: “The 
proclivity of politicians to expand public debt in preference to tax increases” demonstrates 
an assumption against Ricardian equivalence.67 While Barro might have been able to 
discern a rational official purpose behind the movement of the debt through mathematical 
regression, Buchanan saw a different relation in real-time. This difference marks Barro’s 
model as improperly founded on incorrect premises regarding the behavior of households 
and politicians in the event of public debt issue. Further, Buchanan noted that Ricardian 
equivalence would predict no change in the savings rate as a result of Social Security, but 
this does not match the measured decrease in private saving in the United States.68 If both 
government officials and private individuals do not act in accordance with Ricardian 
equivalence, then it should not be accepted. Despite the correlative evidence that Barro 
produced, his premises do not reflect reality. Therefore, his model does not hold over a 
large range of behavior.  Buchanan thus held his ground in terms of the more technical 
elements of public debt analysis, as well as his constitutional conclusions in his initial 
response to Barro’s arguments. 
 
Buchanan continued his critique of Barro implicitly by examining the fundamentals of 
Ricardian equivalence in another article. While the overall topic of the article is Ricardian 
equivalence as such, Buchanan cited Barro on the first page as an example of the 
“surprising resurgence” in the idea’s application to economic analysis, demonstrating the 
clarity of the debate taking place.69 In rebutting Barro’s use of the Ricardian equivalence 
theory here, Buchanan argues that Ricardian lump-sum taxation is not the conventional 
model and that proportional income taxes is more appropriate, which alters the basic 
analysis.70  
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Further, Buchanan argued that the differing time-streams of income faced by different 
individuals in the economy would lead to different perspectives on debt issue. A boxer with 
substantial current-period income that tapers off later in life will favor debt financing, but a 
medical student with little income now but substantial increases expected in the future will 
prefer tax financing.71 Equivalency does not hold on this ground given that the time-stream 
of income is susceptible to individual responses to government policy. Buchanan argued 
that Ricardian equivalence mistakenly assumes only one type of taxpayer response to debt 
issue – saving more so as to be able to pay for the increased later tax liability. Nevertheless, 
on an individual level, assuming the usual income tax structure, taxpayers have an 
incentive to increase their income now and decrease their saving so as to pay less in the 
income tax later.72 Therefore, Buchanan argued, the individual very well may seek to shift 
income from future to the present. Ricardian equivalence is not a clearly commanding 
explanation of human behavior, and, as such, stands or falls on the empirical evidence, 
which Buchanan already critiqued directly. 
 
Buchanan continued in this article by tying his arguments against Barro and Ricardian 
equivalence into his original public debt arguments.73 He also critiques Barro’s claim to 
have developed a “theory of public debt” as “a contradiction in terms if debt and taxes were 
identical.”74 Ultimately, Buchanan argued that equivalence fails because “Debt issue will 
tend to discourage savings and capital accumulation relative to that which would be 
generated under tax financing of the same public expenditures.”75 As a result, Ricardian 
equivalence is untenable and acts as a cautionary tale to economists “prone to advance 
hypotheses prematurely.”76 
 
With his next critique, Buchanan and his co-author, Jennifer Roback, went even further, 
specifically addressing Barro’s 1974 paper and seeking to rebut his work specifically and 
not just Ricardian equivalence generally. It becomes clear in this paper that Buchanan saw 
the implicit threat in Barro’s work and did not simply dislike some of the underlying 
fundamentals on theoretical grounds. Buchanan writes “from this [Barro’s] conclusion, the 
inference has been drawn that public debt issue, as such, imposes no net costs. As we shall 
demonstrate, such an inference is incorrect”.77 Coming in 1987, at over a decade’s distance 
from Barro’s original article, Buchanan’s continued focus on it likely demonstrated a 
shifting of opinion in the field in favor of Barro.  
 
Buchanan attempted to reverse this trend by arguing that Barro’s Neutrality Theorem goes 
further than Ricardian Equivalence regarding the former’s contention that debt issue has 
                                                          
71 Ibid, 396.  
72 Ibid, 396.  
73 “the old Keynesian distinction between internal and external debt is not relevant here (as all parties to 
the debate agree)”, Ibid, 398.  
74 Ibid, 402.  
75 Ibid, 406.  
76 Ibid, 407. 
77 James Buchanan, The Collected Works of James Buchanan, Vol. 14, Debt and Taxes, “The Incidence and 
Effects of Public Debt in the Absence of Fiscal Illusion,” (Liberty Fund Inc., Indianapolis: IN, 1999), 408. 
Page 28                                                                                  Schwartz • Public Principles and Economic Legacy 
 
no effect on rates of consumption and saving.78 This assumes that each individual’s budget 
constraint remains identical under neutral, debt financing, and tax financing scenarios, 
yielding precisely balanced tax and debt liabilities for individuals. This full neutrality can 
only result if the actual transfers are “allocated so as to balance precisely their correctly 
assessed shares in the present value of the debt-induced liability.”79 Given this necessity, 
Buchanan argued that the debt-funded cash transfers in the present may not correspond 
exactly to the debt-induced tax liabilities in the future. In this case, the exact offsetting of 
the effects on consumption of the government operation will be unlikely. Further, if the 
government uses the present finances to provide public goods and services, Buchanan 
found it likely that the citizens will consider themselves better off or worse off, contrary to 
Barro’s neutrality theorem.80 Finally, the effects on consumption and saving from consumer 
perceptions of the government debt operation cannot be predicted without knowledge of 
each individual’s intertemporal utility function.81  
 
Nevertheless, despite his clear disagreements with Barro, Buchanan explicitly recognized 
their similar goal in critiquing the Keynesian macroeconomic perspective on public 
finance.82  Still, as pointed out above, Buchanan saw harmful conclusions that could be 
drawn for his own contributions to public finance if Barro’s presuppositions were widely 
held. Buchanan wrote “Our analysis concentrates on the implications” of Barro’s 
assumptions.83 Therefore, in this article, Buchanan returns to the fundamentals of his 
earlier arguments, even citing Public Principles of Public Debt directly. This allowed him to 
establish a basic motivation for debt issue: “As borrowers, individuals are, in effect, drawing 
down the capital values of their expected income streams in exchange for enhanced levels 
of spending in the current period.”84 However, if Barro’s premises hold true and citizens 
are indifferent between debt and tax finance, “there is no clear motivation for borrowing.”85 
This would indicate a clear theoretical flaw in Barro’s work, given the extensive public 
borrowing that does occur. 
 
Therefore, Buchanan sought to explain government borrowing in terms specifically related 
to Barro’s model. He wrote, “an increase in the national debt while holding private 
bequests constant is an exact substitute for a direct decrease in private bequests.”86 Barro’s 
neutrality can hold if all individuals and family units seek to leave bequests to their 
descendants. However, Buchanan developed a more realistic framework which includes 
Ants – individuals whose utility equilibrium includes positive bequests to heirs – and 
Grasshoppers – individuals whose utility equilibrium includes no such bequests. 
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Grasshoppers will receive benefits from the present spending funded by government debt 
issue. Yet, they will refrain from issuing any bequests to heirs, preventing equivalence or 
neutrality from occurring. Thus, “public borrowing brings the possibility of making 
negatively valued bequests within the feasibility set, an alternative that is not readily 
available to people in their private economizing capacities.”87 Barro’s results cannot hold, 
according to Buchanan, unless all benefits from lower present taxes and higher current 
government goods or services accrue to Ants.  
 
Buchanan moves to consider several specific scenarios of cost and benefit incidence for the 
Ant and Grasshopper model, but the overarching point is that a mathematical analysis of 
utility in an overlapping generations model does not accurately or completely map human 
responses to debt issue possibilities. Thus, Barro’s neutrality theorem does not provide a 
motivation for the issuance of debt in a situation of Ricardian equivalence, but, rather, a 
more accurate understanding of the different individual responses to debt issue reveals the 
importance of individuals who may desire negative bequests. Further, if the Ants who do 
experience utility gains from positive bequests are faced with a political choice between 
debt or tax finance, they may be indifferent as Barro proposes. This means that the 
Grasshoppers have the only clear incentive for political action in this field, presenting them 
with a path to political dominance as an interest group.88 Thus, “even in a situation where a 
large proportion of persons may prefer to leave positively-valued bequests to their heirs, 
the implied opposition to debt financing may be overwhelmed” because of “the influence of 
interest groups over and beyond the interaction of voters”.89 Buchanan showed that the 
behavior of individuals according to Barro’s model and expectations mitigates the impact 
of debt finance, but it is improper to assume that all individuals will uniformly conform to 
those assumptions. 
Buchanan Further Develops His Model – Public Choice 
This demonstrates Buchanan’s increasing integration of public choice theory into his public 
debt articulation. Rather than responding to the equations that Barro presents, Buchanan 
presents a different model that focuses on the motives of government action, the role of 
individual and collective incentives, and the political process. In the later stages of the 
debate over public debt, this use of public choice became increasingly prominent in 
Buchanan’s writings relevant to broader questions of public debt than his contention with 
Barro alone.   
 
Public Choice economics is very evident in one of Buchanan’s book-length works from this 
period, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. While he touched on 
several general critiques of Keynesian political economy, the title reveals Buchanan’s 
continuing mental focus on issues of public finance, as does the work’s contents. Indeed, he 
begins his critique of Keynes by quoting C.F. Bastable, a classical economist whose work 
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was cited in Public Principles of Public Debt. In this work, however, Buchanan relies on 
Bastable to elaborate the basic Smithian principle that expenditure and revenue should be 
analytically tied to prevent public profligacy.90 While he still noted that debt shifts financial 
burden to future taxpayers, Buchanan also argued that deficit finance is unwise because it 
violates a fundamental decision rule: simultaneously presenting costs and benefits to the 
decision-maker.91 The technical arguments of Buchanan’s earlier debate positions have 
been enriched by his integration of public choice to better understand and lay out the 
incentives facing voters and politicians in a democratic society.  
 
When he moves to an explicit consideration of the issues of public debt, Buchanan begins 
his argument by summarizing and citing his arguments from Public Principles of Public 
Debt, which he continued to integrate throughout the rest of the book.92 Nevertheless, his 
original argument, that the analogy between public and private debt is fundamentally 
sound, significantly expands in Democracy in Deficit with a basic point: “A decision to 
‘purchase’ these benefits [of government expenditure through debt finance] is presumably 
made through the political rules and institutions in being.”93 While this may appear simple 
in light of later public choice developments, it shifts the mode of analysis from the technical 
economics of debt to the different mechanics of the polity facing the present voting citizen 
who gains from debt finance. This demonstrates a clear contrast between public and 
private debt, which Buchanan unfolds as follows: 
 
If an individual borrows, he incurs a personal liability. The creditor holds a 
claim…and the borrower cannot readily shift his liability to others…Compare 
this with the situation of an individual who is a citizen in a political 
community whose governmental units borrow to finance current outlay. At 
the time of the borrowing decision, the individual is not assigned a specific 
and determinate share of the fiscal liability that the public debt represents. 
He may, of course, sense that some such liability exists for the whole 
community, but there is no identifiable claim created against his privately 
owned assets. … Because of this difference in the specification and 
identification of liability in private and public debt, we should predict that 
persons will be somewhat less prudent in issuing the latter than the 
former.94 
 
This comparison of public and private decision incentives is only the first of many key 
insights in public finance which Buchanan developed through public choice analysis. He 
calls another the “allocative bias.”95 This is basically the argument that “taxation and debt 
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finance exert differing effect on observed political outcomes.”96 Thus, under a regime of 
debt finance, individuals will tend to “purchase” more public goods and services through 
borrowing than they would through taxation. Further, Buchanan also notes an inflationary 
bias – individuals will borrow a higher percentage for government revenue than is 
optimal.97 Buchanan’s public choice insights are not limited to comparisons of different 
methods of public finance but extend to the likely impact of changing political institutions 
on those methods. Thus, “Changes in tax institutions, for instance, will normally change the 
tax shares and tax prices assigned to different persons. This, in turn, will alter individual 
responses to particular budgetary patterns.”98 The critique of Keynesian theory that the 
public choice analysis allows is powerful: 
 
The direct effects of budget deficits are sensed only in terms of personal 
gains. The creation or increase of a deficit involves a reduction in real tax 
rates, an increase in real rates of public spending, or some combination of the 
two. In any event, there are direct and immediate gainers, and no losers, 
regardless of whether the economy suffers from Keynesian unemployment.99 
 
Not only does public choice strengthen and diversify Buchanan’s attacks on Keynesianism, 
it also provides a platform for further rejection of Ricardian equivalence. He argues first 
that the theorem embodies unrealistic knowledge expectations for its citizens. This does 
not address equivalence on technical grounds but rather the basis for decision by the 
relevant agents. Buchanan addresses incentives more directly as well, arguing that the 
taxpayer may not and need not consider long-run consequences of behavior.100 In the long 
run, the taxpayer will have perished, receiving the benefits of the investment, hopefully 
without having to pay for it all. While the taxpayer may certainly consider the future costs 
for his descendants as taxpayers, he is not required to have enough virtue to do so. Because 
debt issue transfers burdens to the future, it “creates incentives for increased public 
spending” for which Ricardian equivalence fails to account.101 
 
Another example of Buchanan’s use of public choice in the realm of public debt comes in his 
1986 article “Public Debt and Capital Formation.” The public choice framework is clearly 
implanted throughout the article, such as when Buchanan simply states, “There is no 
difference between individual, firm, agency, or public borrowing.”102 Thus, Buchanan is 
able to move to the argument that government’s failure to use debt finance to fund long-
term investments is analogous to individual borrowing for the purpose of consumption. In 
this case, “Debt issue becomes equivalent to the ‘eating up’ of capital value, pure and 
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simple.103 Even the counter-argument that government spending is not, in the period of 
incidence, necessarily wasteful, is answered by resorting to an analogy to the drunken 
spree of an individual who saw the benefits in the moment as worthwhile, but must still 
objectively face the burden of his actions in the future term.104 The government officials 
who weigh costs and benefits in setting policy might not appreciate the comparison, but 
Buchanan is applying the same economic motivations to them as an economist would to 
individual behavior in the marketplace, which is the core of public choice.  
 
Buchanan does not merely refer to the politicians’ “natural proclivities to spend without 
taxing,” but also relies upon constitutional remedies rather than advocating recourse to 
more efficient policy. The chapter, published in the year Buchanan won the Nobel Prize, 
demonstrates the peak of his public choice analysis uniquely applied to the field of public 
debt when most of his opponents, contemporary and historical, focus solely on 
macroeconomic theory. This is not to say that Buchanan moved away from his initial 
theoretical contributions to public debt in Public Principles of Public Debt. On the contrary, 
this chapter contains substantial critiques of Keynesian economics, considers the analogy 
between private and public debt legitimate, and presents debt as leading to a future 
burden.105 By the late 1980’s however, Buchanan’s view of public finance in the specific 
area of debt issue had become methodologically and theoretically diverse, marking his 
contributions as stronger than his opponents. The Nobel Prize for Economics in 1986 
brought the recognition of the field that this was the case.  
The Modern Turn Away from Buchanan 
Nevertheless, only a few years after Buchanan’s completed exposition in the public debt 
debate, he received little deference from economists in the public choice tradition. The 
success of Buchanan’s ideas had generated a school that followed in his footsteps and found 
his arguments wanting. One of his former graduate students saw Buchanan’s work as in 
need of “a rational reconstruction.”106 A similarly oriented article came from Karen Vaughn 
and Richard Wagner in 1992. There, they argue that the earlier debate “is more a matter of 
analytical incompleteness than an expression of underlying analytical antagonisms. All 
sides to this controversy represent different incomplete descriptions of the same analytical 
elephant, so to speak, and do not represent conflicting portraits of three different 
animals.”107 When even economists from George Mason argue that Buchanan was only 
correct in “a sense,” just as Barro and the Keynesian Lerner were, Buchanan’s arguments 
have fallen out of favor.108 The article in question criticizes Buchanan for over-aggregation 
in reference to generations, arguing that his distinctions are too sharp between one 
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generation and the next, just as Lerner and Barro over-aggregate by ignoring individuals 
and focusing on national accounting.  
 
In this presentation, Buchanan’s work began to be considered one thought among many 
equally valid ideas contributed over a long history of the debate over public debt. His 
unique integration of Public Choice became less visible as a result of the attempt to 
synthesize and modernize more technical questions associated with public debt theory. 
Indeed, the authors of this particular article ultimately take positions that are at odds with 
Buchanan’s fundamental arguments. They state “‘we must owe debt to ‘ourselves’ and that 
Ricardian equivalence must hold.”109 While their article’s title suggests a focus on 
reconciliation among the three schools of Barro, Buchanan, and Lerner-Keynes, their 
conclusion’s acceptance of the presuppositions of only two groups suggests a severe 
disadvantage for Buchanan in their presentation. The article’s unique contribution, using a 
model of the political process to suggest that debt finance amounts to transfers among 
present taxpayers according to their intergenerational altruism, seems closest to Buchanan 
in its orientation for policy. Nevertheless, as the authors’ focused on the fundamentals of 
the debt debate and their conclusion favored the other schools and used Barro’s model 
explicitly, this would signal a turn toward such modeling and fundamentals in the field as a 
whole.  
Analysis of Current Literature 
The pro-Barro modelling of the article by Vaughn and Wagner effectively foreshadowed 
what is seen in the field of public debt analysis today, which a review of a sample of modern 
articles in this field will suggest. The use of Barro’s assumptions and modelling principles 
predominates, generating a focus on mathematics rather than human behavior. The 
conclusions vary, but the work resembles the Keynesian and Ricardian approaches far 
more than it does Buchanan’s Public Principles of Public Debt. One example of such an 
article is “Impact of Public Debt on Economic Growth: Evidence from Indian States.” The 
paper begins with an evident grounding in the generally Keynesian ideas that Buchanan 
critiqued, citing Paul Krugman and dividing debt categorically into the external and 
internal categories that the new orthodoxy of Buchanan’s day emphasized.110 But, perhaps 
more importantly, the overall assessment of the literature as to the various schools, 
hypotheses, and conclusions formulated regarding the theoretical framework of public 
debt is inconclusive.111 The authors do not find a particular viewpoint determinative for 
their own work.  
 
The theoretical framework that Dr. Mohanty and Dr. Mishra do provide contains a 
restatement of the Keynesian perspective and the Ricardian Equivalence ideas of the 
Classical School, represented primarily by Barro. Completing this background, the paper 
                                                          
109 Ibid, 46.  
110 Asit Ranjan Mohanty, Bibhuti Ranjan Mishra, “Impact of Public Debt on Economic Growth: 
Evidence from Indian States,” Vilakshan, XIMB Journal of Management, Vol.13 (2), (September, 2016), 1-2.  
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commences with a series of equations and procedures that culminate in a conclusion: “at 
State level, expansionary debt policy will be helpful for the economy in generating higher 
economic growth.”112 As a result, the authors argue that the legislation limiting the ability 
of Indian states to issue debt should be reconsidered, precisely the opposite of Buchanan’s 
constitutional conclusion as a result of his work in public finance. The long-term 
consequences of such a change are considered only relative to economic growth and not to 
the alterations in the constitutional structure, individual behavior, and political outcomes 
that may result. In this paper, then, Buchanan’s thought is absent and his arguments are 
reversed. Given the ascendency of his contributions to public finance only 30 years before, 
such an outcome should be considered a significant shift rooted in the public finance 
articles of the 1990’s, which evened the playing field between the various theories that 
competed for dominance in previous decades.  
 
“Is Public Debt a Burden for India?” is another article that examines the impact of public 
debt. While these authors do consider the possibility that public debt may constitute a 
burden for a given public entity, they cite Franco Modigliani’s work rather than 
Buchanan’s.113 Further, Barro’s overlapping generations model is referenced in the context 
of Ricardian Equivalence with the suggestion that public debt may not be a burden for the 
economy. The Keynesian orthodoxy, associated with the work of Abba Lerner in this as in 
other papers, is expounded to the possible conclusion that public debt and future interest 
payments impose no economic burden.114 The authors directly reference Barro’s work as 
to the significance of Ricardian equivalence in understanding the neutral impact of public 
debt on the economy.115 Once again, though, the overall presentation of the competing 
theories is one of ambivalence. The major historical ideas in the field of public finance are 
footnotes to modern mathematical inquiry and are not authoritative analyses that 
command a response, either of deference or rejection.  
 
The paper continues with a sophisticated application of mathematical techniques to the 
data in question. The relationships between public debt, interest payments, the gross 
primary deficit, development expenditure, and more were all examined, with the ultimate 
conclusion that “public debt is not a burden for India.”116 This paper is much more limited 
in the scope of its arguments regarding policy, noting only that “a better debt management 
framework” than India presently has could be beneficial to the nation’s economic 
growth.117 Nevertheless, this implies a criticism of the Indian Fiscal Responsibility 
Management Act, which currently stands in that country to limit the issue of debt, as 
Buchanan would have hoped for in the United States. Thus, his work is again ignored and 
his conclusions disputed in a recent article on public debt.  
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Another article that touches on the public debt is “That Squeezing Feeling: The Interest 
Burden and Public Debt Stabilization” by Xavier Debrun and Tidiane Kinda. Unlike the two 
previous articles, which were more concerned with economic growth, this one focuses on 
questions of governance and institutional responses regarding public finance. Indeed, the 
authors’ willingness to consider the business of government in light of particular actors 
making economic choices is clear from the introduction.118 This suggests a resemblance to 
Buchanan’s public choice integration in the field, even if only in the broadest terms.  
The article concludes that “a 100 basis-point increase in the effective interest rate leads to 
an average improvement in the primary balance of about 0.1% of GDP” for advanced 
economies.119 Further, governments with advanced and emerging economies respond 
differently to high interest payments, as the former have a threshold of 12% of government 
revenue which prompts debt stabilization, while in the latter, 26% is the threshold.120 
However, the applications of the data lead to political conclusions reminiscent of Buchanan:  
 
[B]ecause rising interest payments appear to encourage fiscal prudence only 
when the crowding-out of socially useful public outlays is large enough, 
protracted periods of low interest rates could feed complacency in the face of 
already high debt levels. Specifically, economies whose central bank is stuck 
at the zero-lower bound – or actively engaged in quantitative easing – are 
more likely than not to continue navigating into high public debt territory for 
the foreseeable future. Reduced incentives to bring down public debt also 
cast doubts on the credibility of any political commitment to do so. This puts 
a premium on backing such commitments with formal fiscal frameworks 
aimed at enhancing discipline through fiscal policy rules or greater 
transparency.121 
 
The authors’ focus on mathematics does not isolate them from the very real behavioral and 
institutional implications of their research. This paper therefore demonstrates that the 
field of public finance is not entirely lacking attempts to understand the political process, 
constitutional structures, and individual incentives that shape public debt policy. However, 
it does not necessarily provide evidence that Buchanan’s contributions are still recognized 
and integrated. It is perhaps more worrisome that this paper did not include any citations 
of Buchanan than that the other articles lacked such a mention. The latter were not 
necessarily focused in applications of public debt where Buchanan was primarily 
concerned, while here the main considerations are the future, public actors, and the debt as 
                                                          
118 Xavier Debrun and Tidiane Kinda , “That Squeezing Feeling: The Interest Burden and Public Debt 
Stabilization,” International Finance 19:2, (2016) 148. “Like all aspects of fiscal policy, however, governments view 
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burdensome. While Buchanan’s ideas may therefore be supported by this paper as 
independently recognized and evidenced, it is problematic that his foundational 
contributions to work such as this are not applied to a significant degree in the recent 
context.  
 
Another paper on the public debt is “The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Deficits,” by 
Henning Bohn.122 While this article was written in 1998, it has been foundational to a 
number of the papers already mentioned.123 Like the previous work on government 
responsiveness to interest rates, Bohn was primarily concerned with government 
responses in light of particular public finance dynamics.124 As noted above, this is similar to 
Buchanan’s work. Nevertheless, like many of the recent articles that deal with public debt, 
Bohn accepts the framework that Robert Barro established depending on Ricardian 
Equivalence.125 As a result of these different presuppositions, Bohn is led away from 
Buchanan’s concern with the difficulty of controlling a government that continually resorts 
to additional debt issue. Bohn writes, “Given the estimated positive response of primary 
surpluses to the debt-GDP ratio, the government budget identity implies that the debt-GDP 
ratio should be mean-reverting.”126 Thus, “U. S. fiscal policy has historically been 
sustainable despite extended periods of primary deficits.”127 
 
Unfortunately, Bohn does not even feature a review of the theoretical assumptions that 
most later, similarly-patterned papers do. Now it must be noted that utilizing a 
sophisticated model such as Barro’s or Bohn’s because of its accuracy in reflecting and 
clarifying the relationships it measures is perfectly acceptable. If the overlapping 
generations assumption is accurate, then applying it is proper. But the accuracy of the 
assumption cannot be sufficiently established in a model where the assumption is taken as 
a given. Therefore, Buchanan was always focused on establishing the accuracy of the 
assumptions used by various schools. Bohn’s unwillingness to consider Barro’s model 
beyond its ability to correlate particular phenomena is improper in this light, and a 
departure from Buchanan’s work in public finance.  
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Nevertheless, Bohn does not rely on Barro’s model to exclusion, so his paper cannot be 
considered a direct outgrowth of the latter’s work.128 His paper does note that U.S. fiscal 
policy since 1980 demonstrates a consistent, if not statistically significant, departure from 
previous, expected patterns.129 This could be a result of changing views of governmental 
actors as policy impacts political incentives. Maintaining deficits over a long period of time 
may make the public and their representatives comfortable with debt, weakening the 
necessity of deficit reduction. However, Bohn does not accept this possibility, noting: 
 
 “frequent primary budget deficits do not provide convincing evidence against 
sustainability, because at low interest rates, a variety of sustainable policies will display 
primary deficits on average and potentially for long periods.”130 In Bohn’s paper, and the 
articles that rely on it, Buchanan’s methods are set aside, and his conclusions are therefore 
less likely to be confirmed. This trend is revealed in the modern literature on public debt.  
Despite the trend away from the work of James Buchanan in journal articles, a textbook 
analysis sends a somewhat mitigating signal. The book Economics of the Public Sector is an 
instructive example as its primary author is Dr. Joseph Stiglitz, an economist in the New 
Keynesian tradition who has done significant work on market failure. Interestingly, when 
Stiglitz discusses the burden of the public debt, he begins with some of the basic arguments 
made by Buchanan. For example, “By borrowing, the government places the burden of 
reduced consumption on future generations.”131 This is a straightforward statement of 
Buchanan’s basic argument in Public Principles of Public Debt, which indicates that even 
members of schools opposed to Buchanan’s theory have accepted or conceded to this 
element of his thought.  
 
However, when moving to different parts of the discussion of public debt that Buchanan 
developed, Stiglitz does not always align with his fellow Nobel prize-winner. For instance, 
Stiglitz discusses the Keynesian argument that “debt does not matter because we owe it to 
ourselves,” but does not make use of Buchanan’s discussion.132 Stiglitz refutes the 
Keynesian argument, but on grounds that the original Keynesians would have accepted, 
when he states “we do not, in fact, owe the money to ourselves. The United States is 
borrowing abroad and becoming indebted to foreigners.”133 Buchanan uses methodological 
individualism to differentiate bondholders and taxpayers to make an analysis that suggests 
debt issues is always a burden, while Stiglitz relies on the tenet of the new orthodoxy that 
differentiates internal and external debt which Buchanan also attacked.  
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Stiglitz also discusses the Ricardian Equivalence arguments made by Robert J. Barro, 
rejecting them without incorporating Buchanan’s critiques. As Stiglitz notes,  
 
The evidence does not support Barro’s theoretical contention. …Statistical 
evidence from a variety of countries confirms the experience in the United 
States that private savings does not fully offset government borrowing. This 
is not surprising: individuals are not as rational as Barro assumes (fully 
taking into account public liabilities in current decision making), nor as 
altruistic (setting aside an additional dollar of bequests for their heirs every 
time public indebtedness increases by a dollar).134 
 
This refutation of Barro is certainly legitimate, but it does not reflect the influence of 
Buchanan, whose arguments, as noted above, often attempted to refute Barro’s model on 
theoretical grounds. Stiglitz simply does not go that far. 
Finally, Stiglitz critiques the idea of a balanced budget amendment, which Buchanan 
promoted. The former argues that a balanced budget amendment would “take away one of 
the main tools of economic stabilization. It would make it more difficult to maintain the 
economy at full employment, putting almost all the responsibility on monetary policy.”135 
Thus, Stiglitz leaves aside the constitutional economics that Buchanan emphasized, which 
is only natural for a member of a different economic school. Overall, then, Buchanan’s basic 
argument about the burden of public debt is presented directly, but the assumptions 
behind it and the corresponding commitments are not maintained. This suggests that 
Buchanan’s fundamental contributions to public debt theory are recognized, if perhaps 
overlooked by more technical articles, even though his overall approach remains one of 
many in the field of public finance.  
 
There are some articles in the recent literature that are more favorable to Buchanan’s view 
of public debt. One example is “Living on Borrowed Time: The Trouble with Public Debt.” 
Dr. Vito Tanzi argues that, in the past, debt would have been considered legitimate under 
certain extreme circumstances, but that recent economics has lost sight of the fact that 
some public debt is not productive.  On Tanzi’s view, debt is acceptable when, “(a) fighting 
legitimate wars; (b) dealing with the consequences of great natural disasters; and, in recent 
times, (c) public borrowing during severe recessions” but it is not “a miracle cure.”136 
Further, significant, ongoing public debt is susceptible to corruption, as Tanzi gives Greece, 
Brazil, and Italy as examples.137  
 
Also, Tanzi does not see public finance theory as neutral. Neo-Keynesianism is harmful in 
that it creates arguments for debt spending in recession that are overwrought, promising 
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greater growth than makes sense on orthodox economic lines.138 Tanzi further argues that 
intentional misperception of economic conditions can lead to continual debt financing, 
while Keynes himself saw debt financing as limited to times of severe recession to be offset 
during periods of growth.139 Trends in public finance are dangerous as a result of poor 
theoretical assumptions, according to Tanzi.140 These critiques are similar to those of 
Buchanan in that they focus on the significance of theoretical frameworks and the 
incentives of political actors. Indeed, Tanzi cites Buchanan and Paul Leroy Beaulieu whose 
work was fundamental to Buchanan’s own foray Public Principles of Public Debt.141  
Another current author whose work is more aligned with Buchanan is Alberto Alesina. In 
one article, Alesina begins by stating “Fiscal policy is the area of macroeconomic policy 
most directly intertwined with politics.”142 This is certainly reminiscent of Buchanan’s 
approach and is a strong contrast with other current authors tacking away from including 
political context in public finance analysis. Like many other recent papers, Barro’s model of 
debt issue is of significant importance to Alesina, but, rather than taking it for granted, his 
paper seeks to examine whether or not the evidence of debt issue aligns with the model.143 
Given that the data seems to align only imperfectly with previous models, Alesina moves to 
consider different institutional contexts, arguments, and models which may provide an 
explanation. The lengthy discussion on balanced budget rules and other forms of budget 
institutions flows similarly to Buchanan’s argumentation, although not drawing on it 
directly in most cases. However, when considering questions of “fiscal illusion” and the 
“origin of excessive deficit” that Alesina’s models find, he directly references Buchanan, 
often with remarks to the foundational influence of his work.144 This application of 
Buchanan, rather than assuming the models generated by competing theorists, is a strong 
contribution to the present public finance debate since 2008. 
 
A final economist who has completed significant current work on public debt is Laurence 
Kotlikoff. Much of his work has been focused on developing an understanding of the 
consequences of the public debt, either in using more appropriate concepts such as the 
fiscal gap, or in modeling the long-run consequences to fiscal irresponsibility. At the heart 
of this approach lies the idea of generational accounting, which, “examines the impact that 
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achieving fiscal sustainability has on particular generations.”145 This very approach owes 
much to Buchanan’s refutation of Keynesian thought. If the future impact of debt 
operations is considered merely in terms of internal transfers which have no aggregated 
national impact then future generations are irrelevant to the public debt discussion. 
Kotlikoff, however, pursues studies of whether government debt issue creates productive 
assets or “an added burden that current and future generations must bear.”146 This interest 
in burden is directly aligned with Buchanan’s initial focus in Public Principles of Public Debt, 
and Kotlikoff’s work thereby represents, to some extent, an extension of Buchanan’s 
thought into the current period. Kotlikoff has certainly adapted some of the modern 
techniques such as an overlapping generations model, a form which Robert Barro also 
utilized.147This allows Kotlikoff to avoid some of the criticisms of Buchanan, noted above, 
for excessive aggregation in his divided generations model. However, like Buchanan and in 
contrast to Barro, Kotlikoff sees institutional action as one way of addressing the challenges 
of current incentivization toward public profligacy.148 Thus, Dr. Kotlikoff represents an 
influential current practitioner in the field of public finance whose mode of analysis and 
conclusions both resemble those of James Buchanan. 
Conclusion 
James Buchanan’s work on the public debt made major contributions to the field of public 
finance generally and enlivened heated debates about the appropriate theoretical approach 
and the most accurate empirical arguments. His arguments in Public Principles of the Public 
Debt led to a shift in the majority opinion among economists in some areas, particularly 
regarding the incidence of the debt’s burden on future taxpayers. Nevertheless, other 
elements of his work, such as the rejection of a categorical difference between internal and 
external debt, or the continual critiques of Ricardian equivalence, have not been widely 
incorporated into the economic literature. Current articles often depend on these very 
assumptions that Buchanan rejected. A revived understanding of Buchanan’s public finance 
work on public debt in particular will be valuable for precise study along those lines 
moving forward. 
 
The current economic realities provide a wealth of opportunity for examining theories of 
public debt as the global economy and advances in information technology allow for more 
interconnected and deeper research more than ever before. Yet, economists must avoid the 
tendency to assume that all assumptions are neutral until associated with data. Without the 
correct assumptions, datasets may be extremely liable to misinterpretation. Therefore, a 
renewed engagement in the dialogue over an accurate framework for understanding the 
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entirety of public finance would be beneficial. Few of such all-encompassing frameworks 
exist, and Buchanan’s exposition of a relevant alternatives, burden-incidence, public choice-
integrating infrastructure must be considered a strong one. Increasing the applications of 
public choice to public finance decision-making only enhances the attractiveness of 
Buchanan’s model. Thus, work along this line can aid not only the knowledge of particular 
problems in the field, but also encourage the move toward effective, systematic 
understandings of public finance phenomena. 
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